Abstract: This paper provides a close reading of Erwin Straus' "The Upright Posture" from a disability studies perspective. Straus argues that the upright posture dominates the human world. But he excludes those who dwell in it otherwise. By reviewing phenomenological disability literature, this paper asks what a disabled phenomenology would look like, one rooted in the problem of inclusion from the outset. Disabled phenomenology addresses 'subjectivity' critically, asking: what socio-material arrangements make subjectivity possible in the first place? This project is, I argue, equal parts political economy and existential phenomenology. I conclude with some suggestions for future research.
Introduction
Erwin Straus' "The Upright Posture" (1952) is an underappreciated classic in phenomenological philosophy. Straus, neurologist and phenomenologist, provides an intriguing argument about the kind of world that human beings experience because of their upright existence. "Upright we are," he writes, "and we experience ourselves in this specific relation to the world" (Straus, 1952, p. 532) . Implied within Straus' argument is the belief that all grown human beings share the capacity for upright posture at all times. As a disabled phenomenologist: I can assure my colleagues this is not the case. Not everyone-or everything-is upright. To make this point, I want to pursue a 'disabled phenomenology'; not only do I want to apply phenomenological theory to the 'case' of disability, as in the burgeoning literature (Toombs, 1995; Hughes & Paterson, 1997; 1999; Hughes, 2007; Titchkosky & Michalko, 2012; Abrams, 2013; 2014a) , I want to rethink the basis of the phenomenological enterprise itself.
1 By moving from phenomenological philosophy to disability studies and back again, we gain expanded insight on what it means to be human. The argument unfolds as follows. I begin this paper by outlining and annotating the content of Straus' classic paper-to which I am rather favourable, despite the following section. There, I introduce some phenomenological disability studies, critical of this philosophy's underlying assumptions about human ability and subjectivity. In the final section of this paper, I outline the groundwork for a 'disabled phenomenology', a philosophy that understands including physical and mental difference as essential to fully interrogate human Being.
"The Upright Posture" (1952) 2 Following a wordy introduction, Straus' paper is organized into three main sections. I see no reason to stray from that organization in my description and annotation. Straus emphasizes the importance of uprightness to human being-in-the-world. He is insistent on the centrality of upright posture to the organization of our sensuous existence, and to social organization as a whole. In maintaining uprightness, "man's natural ability opposition to nature enables him to produce society, history, and conventions" (Straus, 1952, p. 536) . Hobbes is only half right when he argues that social order allows us to escape the brutality of the state of nature: maintaining upright posture is a necessary to step away from the 'war of all against all'. Social order is granted to those who can stand it.
Section two, "Human Kinematics", addresses the stages of development for the upright human form. This involves both the evolution of the human species, as well as the personal journey that humans take as they conquer "uprightness in waiting" in childhood. "Upright posture characterizes the human species. Nevertheless, each individual has to struggle in order to make it really his own. Man has to become what he is" (Straus 1952, p. 534) 3 . Just like our evolutionary predecessors, the child striving to stand is learning to participate in the human life-world. 4 Straus outlines three forms of distance, from the ground, things, and 'our fellow men', that shape our being-in-the-world. The sight of each, another essential human attribute, is reshaped when we move from our hands-and-knees to standing. 5 In walking, "the precarious equilibrium reached in standing has to be risked again" (p. 541). As with the extended horizon established in standing, our action horizon, determined by availability, is extended with the bipedal gait.
6 Its limits are dependent on our capacity for upright navigation.
2 Unless otherwise noted, page references in this section refer to "The Upright Posture." 3 Straus uses androcentric terminology throughout his essay. This regrettably restricts his understanding of 'the human': gender is but one of the many forms of human difference that Straus' paper glosses over. For a detailed discussion of gender norms and their impact on human embodiment, see Iris Marion Young's "Throwing Like a Girl" (1980) . I add disability to this list in the following section. 4 Here we find an interesting combination of anatomical and existential language. Straus continues his analysis of the upstanding body in "Upright Posture and the Development of the Human Hand and Arm", drawing a distinction between the hands-aslived, and as extended things. Though he describes the development of the hand and arms in anatomical terms, his analysis is not restricted to the body as Körper (body-as-materialthing). Rather, he proceeds existentially: uprightness produces an intervening space, representing "a medium between me and the world" (p. 548).
The space that surrounds me is not a piece of neutral, extended manifold, determined by a Cartesian system of co-ordinates. Experienced space is action-space; it is my space of action. To it, I am related through my body, my limbs, my hands. The experience of the body as mine is the origin of possessive experience (p. 545).
'Possessive experience' might smack of an individualistic understanding of upright posture and action, but Straus is quick to indicate that our existence is at once shaped by our distance-from-others, walking-with-others, and distance-from-the-ground. Embodied social graces-kneeling, the bow, the salute-each of these are modifications of our uprightnesswith-others, where we 'per-form' the upstanding social body. In our evolution, there is marked change in the ear, a transition from the 'perception of noises', to the ability to analyze sounds in themselves. With the transformation of maw to mouth, language becomes available to human Being. The capacity for discourse emerges. Discourse, as collective discussion, is not reducible to individual somatic equipment, but also the capacity to engage in mutual action space with others. Bodies must be organized in a particular way to make conversation; Straus provides three essential forms of distance: that from acoustic signs, such that "the phoneme can be analyzed in pure form", from things, so that the can be the object of discourse, and from the other person, so "speech can mediate between speaker and listener. Upright posture produces such distances" (p. 559).
In sum, Straus argues that uprightness is the 'leitmotiv' of the human organism. It pervades the kind of world where humans dwell, and divides it from those of our evolutionary heritage-at both individual and species levels-and of other animals. The upright orientation is disclosed within the reciprocal shaping of mind, body and world, Straus contends, allowing us to escape the "wound cut" by the Cartesian division of mind and body.
"Upright posture, which dominates human existence in its unity, makes us see that no right exists for claiming any kind of priority for the drives. The "Rationale" is as genuine a part of human nature as the "Animal"" (p. 560).
Some preliminary remarks on Straus' work are necessary before moving on to phenomenological critiques in the following section. Straus does not address the problem of disability, physical or otherwise, in his paper-past stating that "an individual who has lost or is deprived of the capacity to get up and keep himself upright depends for his survival completely on the aid of others" (p. 532). This treatment is troubling, especially to me as a disabled phenomenologist. Further, I worry that others doing phenomenological disability studies will shy away from Straus' biologically oriented phenomenology because of its plausible association with the 'medical model of disability' (Oliver, 1990) , ignoring problems of oppression and exclusionary social organization. Straus does not address the political economy of personhood; rather he takes a restricted view of functional human embodiment and normalcy as reflective of its entirety. We have, then, two options. We can dismiss Straus as a bigoted member of the old guard, insensitive to the experience of disablement. Or-and this is the option I elect to take-we can admit that disability is missing from Straus' examination, and amend it accordingly. Doing so fixes a significant omission on Straus' part, and offers the opportunity to rethink phenomenology in new and novel ways.
Phenomenological and disability studies critiques
Straus argues that to be human is to be upright. At its most basic, my argument is that this description does not fully encapsulate the wide range of human being. In this section I want to present some phenomenological critiques of Straus' understanding of human nature. I begin with that of Robert Williams (1984) . His critique comes from a 'rehabilitation' standpoint. Next I turn to some work critical of the rehabilitation standpoint, by Rod Michalko (1998) and, elsewhere, by me (Abrams, 2014b) . I conclude this section with a discussion of A.B. Robillard's ethnomethodology (1994; . 8 Though Robillard's criticism is leveled at another phenomenologist, Alfred Schütz, his objections pertain here as well, and he delivers us well to the basis of disabled phenomenology: the political economy of personhood.
Williams' "Ability, Dis-ability and Rehabilitation" (1984, p. 93) provides the most dedicated reading of Straus's upright posture, asking "what happens to those who are deprived of their "uprightness" in either the literal or moral sense […] through becoming dis-abled?" He makes an argument similar to mine: Straus is off the mark, but there is room in his philosophy for "dis-abled" persons.
9 Combining Straus' phenomenological psychology 8 Here I treat ethnomethodology as a successor (social) science to phenomenology, by way of Shütz's influence on Harold Garfinkel (1967) . Notably, Robillard was a student of Garfinkel's. 9 Williams uses the hyphenated 'dis-abled' to avoid a strictly medicalized understanding of disability. His paper spends a fair bit of space justifying this usage. This is most likely due to its date of publication, when disability studies did not have the same academic clout it does today. Since my usage of disability does not solely imply a deficient body, as with that of disability studies more generally, I will continue to use 'disability' as I have throughout this paper. To be able to write papers without these caveats is a small victory, but an important one.
with Merleau-Ponty's, Williams argues that disability extends past simply somatic malfunction, to the world-changing effects of a drastic change in embodied capacity. Here he employs both phenomenologists' existential understanding of 'world'. In doing so, Williams is interested in the rehabilitation of disability as a state afflicting previously able-bodied persons, a problem that is to be corrected. Admittedly, this is the point of rehabilitation, and we cannot fault Williams for that. But, for disability studies and for disabled phenomenology, there is much more to disability, as a way of being, than simply its correction. Rod Michalko's The Mystery of the Eye and the Shadow of Blindness (1998) spends a full chapter, of the same name, on rehabilitation. 'Bite' may indeed be 'subordinate to sight', but Michalko, a blind theorist, critically assesses how blindness is made subordinate to sightedness in ophthalmology, and later by rehabilitation. In so doing, Michalko's critical disability studies perspective draws from many traditions, symbolic-interactionist sociology and existential phenomenology among them.
Rehabilitation understands sight as embodied in an 'ideal actor.' This ideal actor is someone who is like every other sighted person insofar as he or she can see, and potentially do, what everyone else can see and do. This ideal actor is an actor who 'fits in' and, ideally, cannot be distinguished from any other actor on the basis of 'looking like' he or she can see. Rehabilitation's ideal actor moves through the world looking like everyone else who can see (Michalko, 1998, p. 93 ). The task of rehabilitation, then, is as much about the installation of sightedness in a person who can never make the grade, as it is in preparing blind persons for the everyday life-world. Rehabilitation produces "a sighted person whose sight is missing" (Michalko, 1998, p. 69) . Rehabilitation shapes "techniques of the body" (Mauss, 1973) , but shapes them to mimic sighted norms.
I aim, I think, less critical of rehabilitation than Michalko. Reflecting on my own experience of physiotherapy, 10 I argue that 'symptoms' of physical disability were themselves an interactive accomplishment, rather than simply the treatment of problems 'out there', ready for treatment (Abrams, 2014b) . Drawing on Heidegger's (1996) "ontological difference", the difference between human Being and the being of merely present things, I argue that the patient and practitioner actively shape the body-as-object for medical practice. The upright posture is implicated here, at least in terms of its decline and restoration. The difference between falling as a symptom of muscle disease and the experience of falling is the ontological difference. Only in second order reconsideration of the past event of falling can it be disclosed in objectively present terminology and causality, as in the 'how', the 'why', and the 'when.' "What happens when you fall?" is an ontologically more problematic question than first appears. In terms of the management of appearances in-the-social-order, recovering from a fall and explaining its 'cause' to onlookers is a sight missed by Straus' upright gaze.
Finally, A.B. Robillard draws on his personal experience of disablement to critique the philosophical belief in a uniformly shared lifeworld. Take "Anger in the Social Order": "I am an expert on anger" he argues, "a virtual black belt in giving and receiving affronts to Alfred Schütz's assumptions that we are in a common, intersubjective world" (1996, p. 18) . Unable to move his vocal chords, be ambulatory, or dictate his somatic orientation, Robillard finds himself in many moments where 'interactional asymmetries', produce anger. He writes of two asymmetrical moments, a chance meeting at the mall and an evening dinner party, where anger emerges.
My failed attempts to initiate and maintain eye contact and conversation, as well as my unavoidably less than successful reliance on others to position me and translate for me, can be considered ethnomethodological demonstrations of the embodied commonsense knowledge used to 'do' a chance meeting in the mall and to 'do' a party. My anger and frustration was generated by the refusal of my body, even with the assistance of others, to exhibit the textual signs of participating in a chance meeting or party (Robillard, 1996, p. 28 ).
An historical examination of anger would not, Robillard argues, provide adequate description of how these asymmetries emerge in the life-world, reconsidered as far messier than in Schütz's account, less upright than Straus'. These interactional asymmetries will, however, provide us basis for (disabled) phenomenological reflection below.
These personal affronts to intersubjectivity are more than simply aggravating; in "Communication Problems in the Intensive Care Unit" (1994), he documents a threemonth hospital stay, much of it in intensive care. Robillard's use of alternate means of communication, a lip reading assistant or a letter-board in their absence, deeply shape contact with medical professionals. "This fieldwork is not recommended" (Robillard, 1994, p. 385) . Because of the organization of health care labor in Haiwaii, many nurses spend short tenures in the hospital, flown in and from the mainland United States. Because of the time needed to formulate full sentences, Robillard's ability to communicate is at the whim of the political economy of nursing. Rational subjectivity has its costs. In order to communicate and participate in social order, in order to be a rational subject, particular infrastructure has to be in place. These 'communication problems' show that intersubjectivity is not simply the outcome of being in the same room with another person. It is dependent on sociomaterial arrangements that allow rational subjectivity to emerge as an organizational consequence. This is the political economy of personhood.
Taken together, the work of Robillard, Michalko, and Williams demonstrates that there is something missing in Straus' account of human being. I would like to add my voice to this chorus. The statement "to be human is to be upright" is not fully encapsulating of humanity. To suggest that this experience is the full spectrum of humanity, and then to base a philosophy of human existence on that less-than-full spectrum, is to wholly exclude those who do not fit the able bodied, upright mold. This is an unacceptable exclusion. Disability studies has long been characterized as "emancipatory research" (Barnes, 2003) , making the problem of exclusion its purpose. Redressing Straus' exclusion of embodied differences does not simply mean adding non-upright humans to the roster. It also means introducing phenomenology to disability studies' lessons about the sociomaterial origins of human difference, ability, and subjectivity. In the following section, I want to ask what phenomenology would look like, should it take the political economy of personhood as its point of departure.
From the phenomenology of disability to disabled phenomenology
To try and reorganize an entire philosophical tradition in a single paper would be folly. Indeed, this is exactly what the first two sections of this paper have argued. I do not want to repeat this mistake. Rather, I want to use the final section of this paper to sketch out the possible contours of disabled phenomenology. I do so by focusing on a single problem, that of 'rationality in the social world'. To this problem I apply the dividends of section two, and the ontological work of Martin Heidegger and Sarah Ahmed.
I take this problem from the title of the painfully dry paper by Alfred Schütz (1943) , made livelier in the final of Garfinkel's Studies (1967, pp. 262-283) . For Straus, rationality seems to have an immediate biological genesis. We have evolved the upright posture and other somatic equipment that making rational calculation possible. Though this argument finds it most extreme statement in Straus' paper, I believe it is also present in Husserl, even his later work on the life-world (1970). I need not reiterate at length its well-known contents to the readers of this journal, past stating the following. In his critique of both rationalist and empiricist philosophies, Husserl argues that intentional structures underlie the possibility for sense experience, for either camp. Descartes and the rationalists fail to explore the intentional consciousness that make the Meditations possible; Hume and the empiricists fail to read sense experience as intentional, with its mechanisms available following the epoché and the exploration of transcendental subjectivity. In line with Husserl's critique, however, I want to argue that there are organizational conditions of rational intersubjectivity that must be met beforehand.
This argument is hardly original. Both Sarah Ahmed and Martin Heidegger contribute to it in one form or another. Heidegger, both in Being and Time (1996) and more explicitly in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1982) , argues that the problem of intentional consciousness, thus of consciousness writ large, is an issue much farther downstream than the basic mode of human being, as disclosed in care.
11 Discussing the human way of being in terms of rational calculation, based on subjective conscious states, takes second order descriptions of care as representative of Dasein. It ignores the ontological difference. To this I only want to add that the act of second order description takes place in the shared human world, and is itself exemplary of the political economy of personhood. Focusing singly on the isolated epistemological subject is obfuscatory and excluding, in that it brackets the sociomaterial conditions of subjectivity's possibility.
Though she does not address disability in her Queer Phenomenology (2006), Sarah Ahmed provides support for this argument as well. She does so at two points. First, in "Orientation towards Objects" (pp. 25-63), Ahmed unpacks the relationship between perception, action and direction in Husserl's Ideas (1931) among other work cited above, Marion-Young, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty included. With Audre Lourde's "paperless philosophy" she asks what domestic organization must take place for anyone to be able to do phenomenology at all. We must take 'the material' seriously.
The fantasy of a paperless philosophy can be understood as crucial not only to the gendered nature of the occupation of philosophy but also to the disappearance of political economy, the "materials" of philosophy as well as its dependence on forms of labour, both domestic and otherwise (p. 34).
To this I would only add that gender is one of many ways of being implicated in the process: 'ability' matters as well. Secondly, Ahmed is critical of 'rational subjectivity' in "Sexual Orientation" (pp. 66-107). In the cultural matrix of compulsory heterosexuality, "the very idea that bodies "have" a natural orientation is exposed as a fantasy in the necessity of the enforcement of that orientation, or its maintenance as a social requirement for intelligible subjectivity" (p. 85). If particular forms of action must take place for subjectivity to be possible in the first place, forms of desire or of anything else, then the 'essential' nature of that activity must be called into question. Again, I would only add physical and mental difference to the equation.
We are a long way from a disabled phenomenology. But we have a start towards a truly inclusive philosophy, disabled, queer or otherwise-the name is much less important than the project itself. That start is found when we admit that phenomenology, both in Straus and in Husserl, is not presuppositionless. It takes place only when particular bodies are brought into contact, and only under strict social and material conditions in the life-world. The ability to be a subject and come into contact with other subjects, inter-subjectivity, is of sociological and philosophical importance, and forms the basis of the project that I propose here. The crucial point taken from disability studies is that the inability to become a subject is not, in itself, a property of problem bodies. It is a property of exclusionary social and material organization. Disabled phenomenology is equal parts political economy and existential philosophy.
Conclusions
I began this paper by assuring the reader that not all humans can be characterized in their ability to maintain upright posture. This was not the case in the argument that I outlined in the first section of this paper. In "The Upright Posture" Erwin Straus provides an evolutionary phenomenological argument about the necessarily upright world in which humans dwell. I countered that this argument is not fully reflective of human difference. The point of the paper was not to reject Straus' claims entirely, just to 'revise and resubmit' them to my fellow phenomenologists. I did so by reviewing some phenomenological disability studies, and tempering Straus' claims with the fruits of section two. I argued that phenomenology's use of 'rational subjectivity' must be understood as a problem downstream from more important questions of sociomaterial organization and human equality. By again looking to the problem of rational subjectivity, I suggested that when we orient ourselves to the human condition, we must do so with the understanding that there are material prerequisites that bodies must meet in order to perform phenomenology in the first place. Only then do humans get to be subjects. In attending to these barriers, we are pursuing phenomenological work, isolating which structures are essentially human, and those of exclusionary social order.
